ed as things which are in God,
and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

PROP. XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
modifications of God, and nothing else.

Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in
nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore
the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
and nothing else. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or
infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
passive nature and not to active nature.

Proof.--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by
Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive
rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
thinking. Q.E.D.

Note.--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For
we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
the act of understanding.

PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
necessary cause.

Proof.--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must
also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his