er, must (by the last Prop.)
be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect
does not follow.

Proof.--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
Q.E.D.

APPENDIX:

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
misconceptions before the bar of reason.

All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
namely, with an end in view. It is accepted as certain, that God
himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
him). I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like. However, this is
not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
have the desire to see