he images become quite
confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for
the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms
represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar
causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and
their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses
by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to
imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however,
bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance,
those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animal
without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
everyone will form general images of things according to the
habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note II.--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
From particular things represented to our intell