nce is
self--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
Corollary.--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,
or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,
it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must
be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
appertain. (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.
PROP. XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
of things, but also of their essence.
Proof.--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is
absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
Q.E.D.
Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This
will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of
the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears
from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
PROP. XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
act.
Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our second point is
plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a thing, which has not
been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
absurd.
PROP. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Proof.--This proposition is evident from the th
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