ar as he is considered through the attribute of which they
are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other attribute.

Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other. Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other. Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things
represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
the attribute of thought.

PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv. For
the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
the cause, whereof it is an effect.

Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the
infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the
idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle
existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find