an with the Cavalry.

But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by
no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of
the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for
the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the
carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of
weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry
possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which
render it materially superior to the Infantry.

I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized,
cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is to
say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.

Let us look at this question a little more closely.

A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of
the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual
contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist
pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service,
and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will
be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will
consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their
second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers,
generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight
non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to
the active list.

Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength,
is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on the
active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in their
second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.

It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour
soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr
officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom
four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as
a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us,
shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body
we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be
able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are
all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the
number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add,