e his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse
must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true
'Cavalry Soldier.'

If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i.e._, victory
over the enemy's horsemen--then the next step is to secure rapid
rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally
driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main
force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the
enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring
about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.

That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this
crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is
inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension
of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.

It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his
horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of
his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such
conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own
activity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be
expected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove
of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the
offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces
before such opportunity arrives.

For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most
suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it
implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to
rid himself of such embarrassment.

Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its
position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should
be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the
most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each
Division retains full space for deployment and room to manoeuvre for
the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still
apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.

It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for
action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the
battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This
latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the
troops themselves have been brought forward to the fro