on
first-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon as
possible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it will
only too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will drag
behind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence.

This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary to
enable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action,
whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, because
his troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry,
move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders.
But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice to
lead things into their proper lines without the most successful and
rapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the system
of reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategical
Cavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equally
practical system of security.

On the two subjects so much has already been written that it is
impossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point has
not been brought out sufficiently--namely, that both security and
reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only then
work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematized
method of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I have
considered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I.,
Chap. VIII.).

If reconnaissance--apart from the fact that the roads must be cleared
for it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy's
Cavalry--lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, nevertheless
security depends on the arrangement and activity of the other
branches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking detachments,
and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on thorough
systematization.

When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the main
body from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary to
point out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee the
necessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy which
is requisite for safety.

Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the same
level and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will be
insured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march.

A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essential
condition of comple