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s. Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained, whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed. Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, and strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes of direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight of the technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails. The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is not inconsiderable. If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment. Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if attempted in a single column. Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for 'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is precisely on the defen
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