s.
Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained,
whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to
reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete
concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the
degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads
and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also
hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this
case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for
security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather
than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.
Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, and
strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes of
direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight of
the technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails.
The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than
with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of
troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is
increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is
not inconsiderable.
If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding
him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of
close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere
either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment.
Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for
tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this
is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide
turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought
about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a
mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if
attempted in a single column.
Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will
always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for
'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration
is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not
imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of
one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one
to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is
precisely on the defen
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