ccount by
recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to
another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted
engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such
certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the
combination will be almost as rarely found.

Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire
power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the
troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the
Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great
strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of
judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal
natures.

The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalry
fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is the
dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that under
all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot to
their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once the
most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot of
the Leader.

Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or
immobile horses,[13] and in every case the question arises how the
conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be
dealt with.

[Footnote 13: When only three men in four dismount the horses
are said to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the
horses become 'immobile.']

Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action,
consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is
made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can
be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the
prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight
with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes
with the same body of troops with which such success has been won.
Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some
considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left,
at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of
intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither
operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.

On the whole, in a