e most heterogeneous nature, things which
in their execution mutually exclude one another.

Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the
strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it
becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance
of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with
these many variable demands.

As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of
the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that
the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army--hence the longer time
the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its position, or
execute any similar operation depending on the reports of the
Cavalry--the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.

As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in
contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all
that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other
reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a
certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands
concentration.

It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every
initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstances
may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they
compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile
the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the
tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will
involve.

If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated
above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But
one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for
a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the
concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front,
which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take
advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the
possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such
conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to
engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with
keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing one's self
to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and such
support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in
vehicles) can