e to pick up
their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their
action.
CHAPTER VII
STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY
The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules
for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which
will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping
and employment of the available forces.
Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades
march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind
the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front,
side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road,
whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.
Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually ventures
to trespass on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that
'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together
until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'
I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic
employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very
essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be
detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false
views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical
warfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the ground
the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variable
dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which may
fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly be
all solved by the same formulae.
The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance
on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our
forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also
exercise their influence on our decision.
To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical
necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a
position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of
reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher
considerations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single road
or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will
have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied
objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called
upon to solve problems of th
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