t.

It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior
commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's own
initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.

In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions and
purposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never grasp
the situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually on
the spot, it follows that their orders will generally arrive too
late. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessive
exertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained.
The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances of
these facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never be
made dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, but
must always be based on something positive, which must be followed up
with all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessary
circumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness of
expression in the issue of orders which must never leave the
subordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect a
clear and determined purpose.

It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader must
himself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has also
considered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements in
such a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations a
different direction. This must be particularly the case where success
depends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this will
require the more thorough consideration, because it is most
particularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a large
body of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broad
front. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network of
patrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert it
sideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, in
fact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanced
detachments the news of the change in the dispositions.

A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely necessary to
save both energy and time, and the necessity for instituting this new
service will be particularly detrimental to our whole operations,
because the information from the new direction will generally arrive
too late to be of service.

It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry