he horses very rapidly and only too thoroughly.
It is, therefore, necessary in all independent operations of great
Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and mobile supply
train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for its defence.
The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of
the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the
moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to
the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook
the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For
these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view
since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of
course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also.
In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days'
ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at
least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one
must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the
Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter,
the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the
closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough
must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of
particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours
an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves
give a certain degree of security to the rearward communications.
If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we must
select some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of the
enemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and make
it the point of departure for separate operations.
All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficient
forage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the most
important task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in this
direction can wreck the most brilliant undertakings--jeopardize the
result even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attach
sufficient importance to the point here involved.
Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are both
many-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them when
all subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmost
goodwill and reliability.
With this necessity a new demand is made up
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