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ttack the difficulty is best met by working with 'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the fighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a larger number of units--Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades. From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the 'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all circumstances. If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must be the exact converse. The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective, and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive role in the first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack, constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition. This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far behind the actual shooting line of the position. Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, the Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action he should dismount his men. Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fir
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