y.

Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at
defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.

In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not
allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable
services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the
columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an
orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording
to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and
tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will
gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i.e._, time.

The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself
in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short
surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible
means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, which
restricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits,
seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when it
is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as a
defensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching under
escort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similar
undertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--at
least when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on account
of the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility of
interfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouring
detachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will preclude
such attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to show
how rarely such a circumvention can hope to succeed. But even where
neither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels us
to fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evade
the opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Army
clear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for to
reconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our own
communications (_i.e._, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposes
our flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtaining
tactical results.

Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of
direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our
whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such
outflan