orks are not annoyed by the smells
like the casual passenger. But we find also that wine-tasters
acquire by practice an unusual delicacy of sense; that the eyes once
accustomed to a dim light begin to distinguish objects that were at
first indistinguishable; and so on. What meanings of "custom" and of
"sensibility" will reconcile these apparently conflicting examples?
What are the exact attributes signified by the names? We should
probably find that by sensibility is meant emotional sensibility as
distinguished from intellectual discrimination, and that by custom is
meant familiarity with impressions whose variations are not attended
to, or subjection to one unvarying impression.
To verify the meaning of abstract proverbs in this way is to travel
over the road by which the Greek dialecticians were led to feel the
importance of definition. Of this more will be said presently. If
it is contended that such excursions are beyond the bounds of Formal
Logic, the answer is that the exercise is a useful one and that it
starts naturally and conveniently from the formulae of Logic. It is the
practice and discipline that historically preceded the Aristotelian
Logic, and in the absence of which the Aristotelian formulae would have
a narrowing and cramping effect.
CAN ALL PROPOSITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE SYLLOGISTIC FORM? Probably: but
this is a purely scientific inquiry, collateral to Practical Logic.
The concern of Practical Logic is chiefly with forms of proposition
that favour inaccuracy or inexactness of thought. When there is no
room for ambiguity or other error, there is no virtue in artificial
syllogistic form. The attempt so to reduce any and every proposition
may lead, however, to the study of what Mr. Bosanquet happily calls
the "Morphology" of Judgment, Judgment being the technical name for
the mental act that accompanies the utterance of a proposition. Even
in such sentences as "How hot it is!" or "It rains," the rudiment of
subject and predicate may be detected. When a man says "How hot it
is," he conveys the meaning, though there is no definitely formed
subject in his mind, that the outer world at the moment of his
speaking has a certain quality or attribute. So with "It rains". The
study of such examples in their context, however, reveals the fact
that the same form of Common speech may cover different subjects and
predicates in different connexions. Thus in the argument:--
"Whatever is, is best.
It rains!
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