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ly, as a psychic act. If we would understand it fully, we must consider the act in its relations to the real experience of ourselves and others. To fix this act, we give it a separate name, calling it the conception: and then we must go behind the activity of the mind to the objects on which it is exercised. The element of fixity is found in them. And here also the truth of Nominalism comes in. By means of words we enter into communication with other minds. It is thus that we discover what is real, and what is merely personal to ourselves. [Footnote 1: The only objection to these terms is that they have slipped from their moorings in philosophical usage. Thus instead of Leibnitz's use of Intuitive and Symbolical, which corresponds to the above distinction between Imaging and Conception, Mr. Jevons employs the terms to express a distinction among conceptions proper. We can understand what a chiliagon means, but we cannot form an image of it in our minds, except in a very confused and imperfect way; whereas we can form a distinct image of a triangle. Mr. Jevons would call the conception of the triangle _Intuitive_, of the chiliagon _Symbolical_. Again, while Mansel uses the words Presentative and Representative to express our distinction, a more common usage is to call actual Perception Presentative Knowledge, and ideation or recollection in idea Representative.] PART III. THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPOSITIONS.--OPPOSITION AND IMMEDIATE INFERENCE. CHAPTER I. THEORIES OF PREDICATION.--THEORIES OF JUDGMENT. We may now return to the Syllogistic Forms, and the consideration of the compatibility or incompatibility, implication, and interdependence of propositions. It was to make this consideration clear and simple that what we have called the Syllogistic Form of propositions was devised. When are propositions incompatible? When do they imply one another? When do two imply a third? We have seen in the Introduction how such questions were forced upon Aristotle by the disputative habits of his time. It was to facilitate the answer that he analysed propositions into Subject and Predicate, and viewed the Predicate as a reference to a class: in other words, analysed the Predicate further into a Copula and a Class Term. But before showing how he exhibited the interconnexion of propositions on this plan, we may turn aside to consider various so
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