gs to be
distinguished in this inquiry, which we may call the Concept, the
Conception, and the Conceptual or Generic Image. Let us call them by
these names, and proceed to explain them.

By the Concept, I understand the meaning of the general name, what the
general name signifies: by the Conception, the mental act or state
of him who conceives this meaning. The concept of "triangle," _i.e._,
what you and I mean by the word, is not my act of mind or your act of
mind when we think or speak of a triangle. The Conception, which is
this act, is an event or incident in our mental history, a psychical
act or state, a distinct occurrence, a particular fact in time as much
as the battle of Waterloo. The concept is the objective reference of
the name, which is the same, or at least is understood to be the
same, every time we use it. I make a figure on paper with ink or on a
blackboard with chalk, and recognise or conceive it as a triangle: you
also conceive it as such: we do the same to-morrow: we did the same
yesterday: each act of conception is a different event, but the
concept is the same throughout.

Now the psychological question about the Universal is, What is this
conception? We cannot define it positively further than by saying that
it consists in realising the meaning of a general name: the act being
unique, we can only make it intelligible by producing an example of
it. But we may define it negatively by distinguishing it from the
conceptual image. Whenever we conceive anything, "man," "horse," there
is generally present to our minds an image of a man or horse, with
accidents of size, colour, position or other categories. But this
conceptual image is not the concept, and the mental act of forming it
is not conception.

This distinction between mental picturing or imaging and the
conception of common attributes is variously expressed. The
correlative terms _Intuitive_ and _Symbolical_ Thinking,
_Presentative_ and _Representative_ Knowledge have been employed.[1]
But whatever terms we use, the distinction itself is vital, and the
want of it leads to confusion.

Thus the fact that we cannot form a conceptual image composed
solely of common attributes has been used to support the argument of
Ultra-Nominalism, that the individuals classed under a common name
have nothing in common but the name. What the word "dog" signifies,
_i.e._, the "concept" of dog, is neither big nor little, neither black
nor tan, neither here n