tation of the words "congruence" and "confliction," and
the word "concept". If by concept we mean a conceived attribute of
a thing, and if by saying that two concepts are congruent or
conflicting, we mean that they may or may not cohere in the same
thing, and by saying that a concept is congruent or conflicting with
an individual that it may or may not belong to that individual, then
the theory is a corollary from Aristotle's analysis. Seeing that we
must pass through that analysis to reach it, it is obviously not
a theory of ordinary thought, but of the thought of a logician
performing that analysis.
The precise point of Hamilton's theory was that the logician does not
concern himself with the question whether two concepts are or are
not as a matter of fact found in the same subject, but only with the
question whether they are of such a character that they may be found,
or cannot be found, in the same subject. In so far as his theory
is sound, it is an abstruse and technical way of saying that we may
consider the consistency of propositions without considering whether
or not they are true, and that consistency is the peculiar business of
syllogistic logic.
V. _That the ultimate subject of every judgment is reality._
This is the form in which Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet deny the
Ultra-Conceptualist position. The same view is expressed by Mill when
he says that "propositions are concerned with things and not with our
ideas of them".
The least consideration shows that there is justice in the view thus
enounced. Take a number of propositions:--
The streets are wet.
George has blue eyes.
The Earth goes round the Sun.
Two and two make four.
Obviously, in any of these propositions, there is a reference beyond
the conceptions in the speaker's mind, viewed merely as incidents
in his mental history. They express beliefs about things and the
relations among things _in rerum natura_: when any one understands
them and gives his assent to them, he never stops to think of the
speaker's state of mind, but of what the words represent. When states
of mind are spoken of, as when we say that our ideas are confused, or
that a man's conception of duty influences his conduct, those states
of mind are viewed as objective facts in the world of realities. Even
when we speak of things that have in a sense no reality, as when we
say that a centaur is a combination of man and horse, or that
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