1948, would involve the Department of Defense in the fight for
servicemen's civil rights, thrusting it into the forefront of the
civil rights movement.

Given the forces at work in the department, it was by no means certain
in 1962 that the fight against discrimination would be extended beyond
those vestiges that continued to exist in the military community
itself. In Robert McNamara the department had an energetic secretary,
committed to the principle of equal treatment and opportunity, and,
since his days with the Ford Motor Company in Michigan, a member of
the NAACP. But, as his directives indicated, McNamara had much to
learn in the field of race relations. As he later recalled: "Adam
[Yarmolinsky] was more sensitive to the subject [race relations] in
those days than I was. I was concerned. I recognized what Harry Truman
had done, his leadership in the field, and I wanted to continue his
work. But I didn't know enough."[21-1]

[Footnote 21-1: Interv, author with McNamara, telecon
of 11 May 72, CMH files.]

_The Secretary Makes a Decision_

Some of McNamara's closest advisers and some civil rights advocates in
the Kennedy administration, increasingly critical of current
practices, were anxious to instruct the secretary in the need for a
new racial outlook. But their efforts were counterbalanced by the
influence of defenders of the _status quo_, primarily the manpower
bureaucrats in the secretary's office and their colleagues in the
services. These men opposed substantive change not because they
objected to the reformers' goals but because they doubted the wisdom
and propriety of interfering in what they regarded as essentially a
domestic political issue.

Superficially, the department's racial policy appears to have been
shaped by a conflict between traditionalists and progressives, but it
would be a mistake to apply these labels mechanically to the men
involved. There were among them several shades of opinion, and (p. 531)
they were affected as well by complex political and social pressures.
Many of those involved in the debate shared a similar goal. A
continuum existed, one defense official later suggested, that ranged
from a few people who wanted for a number of reasons to do
nothing--who even wanted to tolerate the continued segregation of
National Guard units called to active duty in 1961--to men of
considerable impatience who thought the off-limits sanction was