ong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is,
fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds.
Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders.
The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified in
them; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are those
of the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a larger
scale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when the
operating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelled
to act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. The
great art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, for
only in this way can the strain of the general situation and the
collective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actual
warfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weighty
consideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought before
their eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modern
warfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations.

The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction of
small-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantly
strategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less important
military exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in this
direction. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that they
conduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all our
resources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of a
modern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (a
rather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range of
the artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become too
small) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisional
manoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this change
could be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: a
great impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre system
if it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization and
execution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word.

It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of training
on so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient to
educate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres can
only show their full value if the officers of every rank w