ess and being are the same really?
(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]
Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore
goodness and being really differ.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
good which has the form of being," according to the commentary on _De
Causis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.
Obj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot
be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good."
_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as
it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as
it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is
clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is
clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness
presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
Reply Obj. 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of
a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies
that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only
in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
simply; but by any further actual
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