ained in the next article.

Reply Obj. 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not
that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I. Q. 6, Art. 3]

Whether to Be Essentially Good Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as _one_ is convertible with _being,_ so is _good;_ as
we said above (Q. 5, A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as
appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
good essentially.

Obj. 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
essentially.

Obj. 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.
Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is
necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore
its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by
some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;
therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness
which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.

_I answer that,_ God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is