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that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to the genus of quantity. Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom., cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle." Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being." _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 2] Whether "One" and "Many" Are Opposed to Each Other? Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every _multitude_ is in a certain way _one,_ as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude." Obj. 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But _multitude_ is constituted by _one._ Therefore it is not opposed to "multitude." Obj. 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many." Obj. 4: Further,
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