ity it is said to have being
relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but
only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebdom.), "I perceive that in nature
the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply--in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
signifies complete actuality.
Reply Obj. 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
knowledge or virtue.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 2]
Whether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being?
Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things
signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the
first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone."
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
Obj. 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect
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