of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for
it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
born" (Matt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
Obj. 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
_On the contrary,_ It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first
of created things is being."
_I answer that,_ In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
prior to goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as
he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness,
since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent
does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to
its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness,
as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore
among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes
being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not
distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was
non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for
primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek
their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed
to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to
non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
Reply Obj. 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
can cause them--if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
those things whic
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