If, however, the
agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will
be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species;
as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created
things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and
universal principle of all being.
Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall
short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that
which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but
because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
Reply Obj. 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus,
and as the principle of all genera.
Reply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
Reply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are
in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not
between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue
is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of
as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
_______________________
QUESTION 5
OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL
(In Six Articles)
We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodn
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