hilosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
appears also from what is said (Luke 18:19): "None is good but God
alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g.
supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
cannot be called the supreme good.
Obj. 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in
the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly
greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same
genus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. 3, A. 5;
4, A. 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in
relation to others.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
_I answer that,_ God is the supreme good simply, and not only as
existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to
God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired
perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above
(Q. 4, A. 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its
effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in
the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it
is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently
than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but
not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most
excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
Reply Obj. 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.
Reply Obj. 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be expl
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