g from
faulty organization, and success had inspired legitimate confidence,
that this subject became matter of much thought and some discussion.

But this faulty organization continued to the end of the Atlanta
campaign, and was, as I think will clearly appear, one of the causes
of many of the partial failures or imperfect successes that
characterized our operations. General Thomas's command often proved
unwieldy and slow from being larger than one man could handle in
a rough and in many places densely wooded country, while the others
were frequently too small for the work to be done. It was often
attempted to remedy this defect by ordering a division or corps of
the Army of the Cumberland to "co-operate with" or "support" one
of the others in making an attack; but military experience has
shown that "co-operate" and "support" mean, in general, to do
nothing effective. The corps commanders, generally, not being in
the habit of acting independently, and not being in direct
communication with the general-in-chief, and hence not familiar
with his plans and views, would not act with the necessary promptness
or vigor; and not regarding themselves as absolutely under the
orders of the general they were directed to support, they would
not obey his orders or requests unless they were in accord with
their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General
Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate
armies under his command and win a victory on his "own hook." But
General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his
own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the
relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question
was evaded until its decision in a special case--that of Stanley
and Schofield--became absolutely necessary, and was then decided
erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment
to Sherman. Had this question been decided at an early day according
to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War
Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead
of "co-operate" or "support," much trouble would have been avoided.

First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were
the operations about Dalton and Resaca. Here I have always thought
General Sherman committed the mistake, so common in war (and, as
I believe, not infrequently afterward committed by himself and
others in the Union armie