t day to turn our position
or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides, our
position, with a river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly
greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped
for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth.
Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault
at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it
was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our
troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations
of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th
absolutely necessary.

HOOD'S ASSAULTS REPULSED

The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on
desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to
undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an
emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to
have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He
must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost.
I believe, therefore, that there can be no room for doubt that
Hood's assault was entirely justifiable. It may have been faulty
in execution, in not having been sufficiently supported by a powerful
reserve at the moment of first success. I have not the means of
knowing the actual facts in this regard; but the result seems to
render such a hypothesis at least probable, and the rapidity and
impetuosity of Hood's advance and assault add to that probability.

It is interesting to consider what would probably have been the
march of events if we had retreated from Duck River in the night
of November 28, upon first learning that Hood had forced the crossing
of that river. We would have reached Franklin early on the 29th,
could have rebuilt the bridges and crossed the Harpeth that day
and night, and Hood could not have got up in time to make any
serious attack that day. So far as our little army was concerned,
for the moment all would have been well. But Hood would have been
in front of Franklin, with his whole army, artillery, and ammunition-
trains, by dawn of day on the 30th; he could have forced the crossing
of the Harpeth above Franklin early that day, compelled us to retire
to Nashville, and interposed his cavalry between Nashville and
Murfreesboro' that night or early on December 1. Thus Thomas's
remaining reinforceme