rmed than I concerning what
passed between General Thomas and himself. I recollect that General
Sherman during the day expressed something like a wish to "let the
Army of the Tennessee fight its own battle," but in his statement
of motive for so doing I think he does that army injustice. My
impression was, and is, that they would have been very glad of
assistance, and that timely help would have increased the fraternal
feeling between the armies, instead of creating unworthy jealousy.

I cannot but believe, as I then thought, that we were losing a
great opportunity that day. A large force of the enemy had made
a wide circuit from his defenses about Atlanta and attacked our
left several miles distant. We there had a chance to fight him on
equal terms. I thought, and still think, we ought to have concentrated
a large part of Thomas's force and mine near the Howard House, and
made a strong counter-attack upon this attacking column of the
enemy, with the hope of cutting it off from Atlanta. Instead of
this, Thomas spent the day in efforts to "make a lodgment in Atlanta"
over well-prepared fortifications which the Georgia militia could
hold against him about as well as the veteran Confederate troops.

The movement of August 4 and 5 was designed to be substantially
what had been frequently suggested, but which I have heretofore
referred to as having never been tried, with the exception that
the attacking force was not to sever its connection with the main
body, and hence might not reach far enough to strike an exposed
flank of the enemy. But even with this modification I thought the
movement ought to have a fair chance of success. That movement
was not suggested by me in any way, and, so far as I know, not by
General Thomas. I believe it originated entirely with General
Sherman. I never heard of it until I received his orders. There
was no "argument" by me of the question of relative rank, as
suggested by General Sherman (Vol. II, page 99).

SHERMAN'S ERROR IN A QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK

The positions of the troops when the order for the movement was
made rendered it convenient that the Twenty-third Corps be put in
first,--that is, next to the right of General Thomas's troops then
in position,--while the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General John
M. Palmer, was relied upon to develop rapidly to our right and
endeavor to strike the enemy's flank before he could extend his
intrench