comparison of this view
with those of other actors and eye-witnesses that impartial history
may ultimately be written.

My present purpose is simply to direct attention to some points in
the history of those campaigns of General Sherman in which I was
one of his principal subordinates, upon which the views of others
were at the time, or have since been, different from his own. In
what I have to say the motive of self-vindication can have little
or no influence; for, with some unimportant exceptions, General
Sherman does relatively full justice to me and to the little army
which I had the honor to command. I shall speak mainly of the acts
of others, especially the noble dead.

FAULTY ORGANIZATION OF SHERMAN'S ARMY

I must preface my remarks by observing that the organization of
Sherman's army during the Atlanta campaign was extremely faulty,
in that the three grand divisions were very unequal in strength,
the Army of the Cumberland having nearly _five times_ the infantry
strength of the Army of the Ohio, and more than twice that of the
Army of the Tennessee, even after the junction of Blair's corps.
The cavalry, of which two divisions belonged to the Army of the
Ohio, always acted either under the direct orders of General Sherman
or of the nearest army commander, according to the flank on which
it was operating. This inequality resulted from the fact that
Sherman's army was composed of three separate armies, or such
portions of them as could be spared from their several departments,
united for that campaign. General Thomas was, naturally enough,
disinclined to part with any of his troops, and the troops did not
wish to be separated from the old army in which they had won so
much honor, nor from the commander whom they revered. Besides,
General Thomas had had much greater experience in the command of
troops in the field than I, and General Sherman, if he thought of
it at all, may well have doubted the wisdom of diminishing the
command of the one to increase that of the other. I do not know
whether this matter was discussed at all before the opening of the
campaign, certainly not by me, who would have been restrained by
motives of delicacy, if by no other, from mentioning it. But in
fact my ambition was then limited to fighting well and successfully
with the single corps under my command. It was only after experience
had drawn attention more pointedly to the evils resultin