picket-line
in position, with strong reserves behind the parapets, and massed
them near my left, ready to send reinforcements to the Army of the
Tennessee if necessary, or to form a temporary left flank if the
line on my left should be broken, as it was late in the day, as
described by General Sherman.( 4)

When that break was made in the line immediately to the left of
mine, I had a rare opportunity of witnessing Sherman's splendid
conduct as a simple soldier, the occasion for which occurs so rarely
to the general-in-chief of a great army. Sherman at once sent to
me for _all my artillery_, which responded to his call at a full
gallop. He led the batteries in person to some high, open ground
_in front of our line_ near the Howard House, placed them in
position, and directed their fire, which from that advanced position
enfiladed the parapets from which our troops had been driven, and
which the enemy then occupied. With the aid of that terrible raking
fire, the division of Union troops very quickly regained the
intrenchments they had lost. General Sherman, on page 81, Vol.
II, gives me the credit due to himself for that soldierly conduct
as an artillery commander. I was occupied in forming my infantry
reserve to meet the enemy if Logan's troops did not drive them
back. Only my artillery was used in restoring this broken line,
because Logan's infantry proved sufficient without further aid.
This action of mine was taken with General Sherman's knowledge and
approval, and was the correct thing to do, for the reason that the
ground in my front was such as to make both my position and that
of the enemy practically unassailable. I had no apprehension of
an attack in my front, and there was no question of my attempting
to "make a lodgment in Atlanta" that day, as stated by Sherman in
Vol. II, page 80.

It was proposed by me that my reserve and Thomas's should go the
assistance of the Army of the Tennessee, either directly or, better
still, by making a counter-attack in front of the right of that
army, which, if successful, would cut off the hostile force then
attacking in left. Sherman replied, as I recollect, that he had
asked Thomas to send some troops to the left, and the latter had
replied that he had none to spare. Without these the proposition
to make a counter-attack could not be entertained. But my memory
is only that of conversations with General Sherman during the day,
and he ought to be much better info