ower of invention or originality of thought. His personal courage
seemed to amount to unconsciousness of danger, while his care of
his troops cannot, I believe, be justly characterized otherwise
than as wise prudence. I consider this to be only a just tribute
to the memory of the nearest and dearest friend of my youth.

If McPherson had commanded one third of the army, he might, with
a corps of Thomas's army in close support, have felt strong enough
to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it
was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear through Snake
Creek Gap, with two corps. The distance between the two wings of
the army would have been so short and the ground between them so
impassable to the enemy as to give us practically a continuous line
of battle, and Thomas's two corps in the valley of the Connasauga
near Tilton would have been in far better position to strike the
retreating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than
they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. Impartial history must,
I believe, hold Sherman himself mainly responsible for the failure
to realize his expectations in the first movement against Johnston.

MCPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA

It seems at least probable that at the beginning of the movement
against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the character of
the enemy's position; for his plan clearly appears to have been to
make the main attack in front at the moment Johnston should be
compelled to let go from his stronghold by reason of McPherson's
operations in his rear; while McPherson, after breaking the railroad
and then falling back for security to the Gap, should strike Johnston
in flank during the confusion of retreat.

The nature of the position rendered this plan impracticable for
producing any important result. Had McPherson broken the road ever
so "good" and then fallen back to the Gap as ordered, Johnston
could have moved his main army to Resaca that night, and at daylight
the next morning Sherman would have found in the enemy's trenches
at Dalton only a skirmish-line which would have leisurely retreated
before him to the new position at Resaca. The result would have
been essentially the same as that which was actually accomplished.

Indeed, as it now seems clearly to appear to General Sherman, the
only possible mode of striking an effective blow at Dalton was to
capture Resaca or seize and