had
kept all his troops in compact order about Atlanta, he would have
been in the best possible condition to resist Sherman if the latter
turned back from Jonesboro' and attacked Atlanta from the rear, or
to strike Sherman's rear or flank in full force if he made any
other movement. The division of Hood's forces at that time, one
part holding on to Atlanta while the other went to _head off_
Sherman, was the worst disposition that could have been made.
As related to me personally by General Sheridan,--for I have not
yet studied the Virginia campaigns so thoroughly as to justify me
in speaking from the records,--it was a similar mistake on the part
of the Confederate cavalry commander J. E. B. Stuart, in trying to
get between Sheridan and Richmond, which gave Sheridan the advantage
and led to Stuart's defeat. Stuart had ridden hard all night, and
got between Sheridan and Richmond, his men and horses exhausted,
while Sheridan had been resting and feeding his own men and animals.
In the morning Sheridan "rode over" his exhausted antagonist.
These are among the many cases where exaggerated ideas of the
importance of places have led to the defeat of armies. I knew
Stuart well at West Point, he having been in the class next to
mine. He then gave promise of his future as a cavalry leader.
The only specially hazardous part of Sherman's movement was that
which would fall to my lot--namely, to hold the "pivot" against a
possible attack of Hood's whole army while Thomas and Howard should
swing round it, and then draw out and join them after the swing
was made. Upon my reporting that I was perfectly willing to
undertake this task, and had no doubt of the ability of my corps
to accomplish it, all question about making the movement appeared
to be settled, and it was at once ordered. Hood did not avail
himself of his opportunity to attack me when alone, either in
position or in motion, hence my part of the movement proved easiest
of all.
I had placed my corps in a completely inclosed field-work, large
enough to contain all my trains, and strong enough to resist any
attack from a greatly superior force until Sherman's movement could
be accomplished.
ANECDOTES OF THE MEN IN THE RANKS
I recollect even to this day a little incident of that time which
was, at least to me, both amusing and instructive. After receiving
Sherman's orders, which meant "suspend aggressive work and go to
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