was assured, as also the future success of the army under my superior
in command. Why run any further risk? If it had been possible
for me, at that moment of supreme satisfaction, to have had any
thought of self, I might perhaps have considered the project of
turning upon my adversary at dawn the next morning, in hope of
routing his dispirited army. But if any man thinks such a thought
possible under such circumstances, he knows nothing about the
character of a patriotic soldier. If the troops I then had at
Franklin had been the sole reliance for ultimate success in the
campaign, nothing could have been clearer than my duty to turn and
strike with all my might at dawn the next day.

(A copy of all the correspondence between General Thomas and myself,
with annotations showing the time of receipt of the several despatches
from General Thomas, thereby showing their influence upon my actions,
has been placed on file at the War Department. These copies of
despatches, with annotations, are intended mainly for the military
student who may care to make a close and critical study of such
military operations. The original records of such correspondence
are often worse than useless, for the reason that the exact time
of sending and receipt of a despatch is so often omitted. All sent
or received the same day are frequently printed in the records
indiscriminately, so that the last if as likely to come first as
otherwise; and, sometimes, historians have used despatches as if
they had been received at the time they were sent, though in fact
many hours or some days had elapsed. My annotations were made in
1882-3, at Black Point, San Francisco, California, with the assistance
of my ever faithful and efficient aide, Colonel William M. Wherry,
now lieutenant-colonel of the 2d United States Infantry, and were
attached to the copies of the records in 1886.)

[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.]

[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, pp. 241 and 413. The loss at
Franklin of Opdycke's six regiments was 205, while the 12th and
16th Kentucky regiments lost 106 men.]

[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1171.]

CHAPTER XI
The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to the Battle of
Franklin--The Untenable Position at Pulaski--Available Troops which
were not Sent to the Front--Correspondence with General Thomas--
Instructions Usually Received too Late--Advantage of Delaying the
Retreat from Duck River--No Seriou