rance
and Russia. The German Government asked for a covenant of absolute
neutrality. This I could not look at. I had the same feeling about such
an agreement for unconditional neutrality as Caprivi had when he was
asked to renew the Reinsurance Treaty which Bismarck made with Russia at
Skiernevice in 1884, and under which, notwithstanding that Germany might
come to owe a duty to Austria to support her as her military Ally, he
bound Germany to observe neutrality in case Russia were attacked by
her. So far as appeared this Reinsurance Treaty probably had suggested
the wording of the analogous formula which the Chancellor was proposing
to myself. But altho we were not under the obligation to France which
Germany was under to Austria in 1884, I felt, to use the words of
Caprivi himself, when he succeeded Bismarck, and was asked to renew the
engagement with Russia, that the arrangement was "too complicated" for
my comprehension. It would have been not only wrong to expose a friendly
France to the risk of being dismembered by an unjustifiable invasion,
while her friend England merely stood looking on, but it would also have
been prejudicial to our safety. For to have allowed Germany to take
possession of the northern ports of France would have been to imperil
our island security. The Chancellor was entitled to make the request he
did, but I was bound to refuse it. I also, at the same time, told him
that if Germany went on increasing her Navy, any agreement with us meant
to lead to better relations would be little more than "bones without
flesh." Germany might, indeed, as he had said, need a third training
squadron, in addition to the two she had already in the North Sea. This
we could easily meet by moving more of our ships to northern waters,
without having to increase the number we were building independently.
But if she had the idea of adding to her fleet on a considerable scale
we should be bound to lay down two keels to every one of her new ships,
and the inevitable result would be, no proportionate increase in her
strength relatively to ours, but of a certainty a good deal of bad
feeling.
I may observe that at the date of this conversation the new German Fleet
Bill had not been made public, and we knew nothing of its contents in
London, excepting that a third squadron for training was to be added to
the two which were already there. For this purpose it had been said that
a few ships and a moderate increase in personnel
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