with a
League of Nations the situation would have mattered much less. It was
the policy of the school to which Tirpitz and the Emperor himself
belonged which made the situation one of growing danger and the Entente
a necessity, for these were days when other nations near us were
beginning to organize great battle-fleets. If Bethmann Hollweg's policy
had prevailed there would have been no necessity for any such Entente as
was the only way of safety for us. But he could not carry his policy
through, earnestly tho he desired to do so, and thus provide the true
way to permanent peaceful relations. I think he believed that the only
use Britain ever contemplated making of her Navy, should peace continue,
was that of a policeman who co-operates with others in watching lest
anyone should jostle his neighbor on the maritime highway. He believed
in the _Sittlichkeit_, which we here mean when we speak of "good form."
But that was not the faith of his critics in Berlin. They wanted to have
Russia, and if possible France also, along with their navies, on the
side of Germany. Peace, yes, but peace compelled by fear--a very
unwholesome and unstable kind of peace, and deadly for the interests of
an island nation. Hence the Entente!
What we had to do was to prevent, if we could, the Tirpitz school from
getting its way, and we tried this not without some measure of success.
Even to-day our pacifists now join with chauvinist critics of a policy
which was pursued steadily for many years, and was that of
Campbell-Bannerman as well as of Asquith. They reproach us for having
entered on our path without having adequately increased our naval and
military resources. The reproach is not a just one. It is founded on a
complete misconception of the true military situation. It is only
necessary to read carefully through Admiral von Tirpitz's very
instructive volume to see that he took precisely the same view as we
did, and as was held to unswervingly by our Committee of Imperial
Defense. England's might lay in final analysis in her sea power. She
needed also a small but very perfect army, capable of high rapidity in
concentration by the side of the great French Army, in order to prevent
the coasts of France close to our own from being occupied by an enemy
invading French territory.
In his book the Admiral refers to a letter I wrote to _The Times_ on
December 16, 1918, pointing this out and the grounds on which the
strategical conception was base
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