lleagues in the Cabinets of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr.
Asquith. And in that July, throughout the weeks in question, Sir Edward
was staying with me in my house in London, and considering with me the
telegrams and incidents, great or small.
It is a pure myth that he had, at the back of his mind, any such
intentions as the Admiral imagines. He was working with every fiber put
in action for the keeping of the peace. He was pressing for that in St.
Petersburg, in Paris, in Berlin, in Vienna, and in Belgrade. He was not
in the least influenced either by jealousy of Germany's growth or by
fear of a naval engagement with her, as Tirpitz infers. All he wanted
was to fulfil what, for him, was the sacred trust that had been
committed to him, the duty of throwing the whole weight of England's
influence on the side of peace. And that was not less the view of Mr.
Asquith, whom I knew equally intimately, and it was the view of all my
colleagues in the Cabinet.
Germany was going ahead with giant strides in commerce and industry, but
we had not the slightest title to be jealous or to complain when she was
only reaping the fruits of her own science and concentration on peaceful
arts. I had said this myself emphatically to the Emperor at Berlin in
1906 in a conversation the record of which has already been given. There
was no responsible person in this country who dreamt, either in 1914 or
in the years before then, of interfering with Germany's Fleet
development merely because it could protect her growing commerce. What
responsible people did object to was the method of those who belonged to
the Tirpitz school. The peace was to be preserved; I give that school
full credit for this desire; but preserved on what terms? On the terms
that the German was to be so strong by land and sea that he could
swagger down the High Street of the world, making his will prevail at
every turn.
But this was not the worst, so far as England was concerned. The school
of von Tirpitz would not be content unless they could control England's
sea power. They would have accepted a two-to-three keel standard
because it would have been enough to enable them to secure allies and to
break up the Entente. Now it was vital to us that Germany should not
succeed in attaining this end. For if she did succeed in attaining it,
not only our security from invasion, but our transport of food and raw
materials, would be endangered. With a really friendly Germany or
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