ces escape his notice which are in a large degree
material for forming a judgment. This does not seem to me to arise from
any deliberate intention to be otherwise than candid. I am sure that he
believes that he is telling the full truth at all times. But he became a
convinced partizan, quite intelligibly. This fact, however creditable to
his patriotism, seems to me not only to explain why he thought it right
to continue in office and stand by his country as long as he could
through the war, but also to detract somewhat from the weight that would
otherwise attach to the opinions of an honorable and well-meaning man.
I pass to the examination of the concurrent policy against which he
could not prevail, and the existence of which takes the edge off his
reasoning. That policy is expounded fully and clearly by Admiral von
Tirpitz, a German of the traditional Military School, a man of great
ability, and one who rarely if ever allowed himself to be deflected from
pursuing a concentrated purpose to the utmost of his power.
Of the general character of this purpose his colleague, Bethmann
Hollweg, was conscious, as appears from passages in the book just
discussed, of which I have selected one for translation.
"The fleet was the favorite child of Germany, for in it the
onward-pressing energies of the nation seemed to be most vividly
illustrated. The application of the most modern technical skill, and the
organization that had been worked out with so much care, were admired,
and rightly so. To the doubts of those versed in affairs whether we were
pursuing our true path by building great battleships, there was opposed
a fanatical public opinion which was not disciplined in the interest of
those responsible for the direction of affairs. Reflections about the
difficult international troubles to which our naval policy was giving
rise were held in check by a robust agitation. In the navy itself the
consciousness was by no means everywhere present that the navy must be
only an instrument of policy and not its determining factor. The conduct
of naval policy had for many years rested in the hands of a man who
claimed to exercise _political_ authority over his department, and who
influenced unbrokenly the political opinion of wider circles. Where
differences arose between the Admiralty and the civilian leadership,
public opinion was almost without exception on the side of the
Admiralty. Any attempt to take into consideration relative pr
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