mate that a small army
from England would be a sufficient addition to enable France to
break the shock of an aggressive attack on her.

5. Even on purely military grounds it was impossible for Great
Britain to raise in time of peace a great army for use on the
Continent. The necessity of recruiting and educating the necessary
corps of professional officers required to train and command such
an army would have occupied at least two generations if the task
were to be taken in hand in peace time. But it was possible to
organize and prepare a small but highly trained Expeditionary
Force, provided we discarded some of our old military traditions,
and studied modern requirements and objectives in consultation
with those who were best able to throw light on them.

6. Altho more than modern and scientific military organization on
a comparatively small scale was not in our power, we could in
carrying out even this much lay foundations which would enable
expansion in time of war to take place.

7. In the result, as was believed here, and as Admiral von Tirpitz
himself seems to have anticipated, sea power and capacity for
blockade would decide the issue of the war. In this respect
Germany seemed less well prepared than Great Britain.

8. The last thing wished for was war, and if we had to enter upon
it we should do so only in defense of our own vital interests, as
well as those of the other Entente Powers. Our entry, if it was to
come, must be immediate and unhesitating. For if we delayed
Germany might succeed in occupying the northern coast of France,
and in impairing our security by sea.

I will conclude this chapter by appending an estimate of the Emperor
William II, which is worth comparing with that of his German Ministers
already referred to.

[Illustration: COUNT OTTOKAR CZERNIN

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY FROM DEC. 1916 TO APRIL,
1918.]

In the chapter on William II in Count Czernin's book on "The World War"
there is a passage which may, I think, turn out to be pretty near the
truth about the late Emperor's mood: "Altho the Emperor was always very
powerful in speech and gesture, still, during the war he was much less
independent in his actions than is usually assumed, and, in my opinion,
this is one of the principal reasons that gave rise to a mistaken
understanding of all the Emperor's administrative activities. Far more
than the public ima