._, Prince Buelow
and the Emperor himself as a rule, was that the foundation of a lasting
peace could only be laid with armaments. Now if this is so it is plain
how the war came about. The "shining armor" oration in Austria, some
years before war broke out, was simply one among many illustrations
which so alarmed civilized nations that they huddled together for
protection against this school of statesmen. Bethmann's was the true
policy had he been allowed to carry it out. It is possible that he
thought he had a better chance of carrying it out than could have been
the case were they to be present, when he got the Emperor and Tirpitz to
keep away from Berlin after the meeting at Potsdam on July 5.
Unfortunately he underestimated the tendencies of Berchtold, Conrad von
Hoetzendorf, Forgasch, and others in Vienna, who, with no misgivings
such as those of Tirpitz as to the outcome, had determined on
"_losgehen_." The proximate cause of the war was Austrian policy. A
secondary cause was the absence of any effective attempt at control from
Berlin. The third and principal cause was the Tirpitz theory of how to
keep the peace, the theory that had come down from Frederick the Great
and his father, and was barely a safe one in the hands of even a
Bismarck.

The only circumstances that could have justified Germany in her tacit
encouragement to Austria to take a highly dangerous step--a step which
was almost certain to bring Russia, France, and England into sharp
conflict with the Central Powers--would have been clear proof that the
three Entente nations were preparing to seize a chance and to encircle
and attack Germany or Austria or both.

Now for this there is no foundation whatever. Russia, whatever Isvolsky
and other Russian statesmen may have said in moments of irritation over
the affair of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not want to plunge into war;
France did not desire anything of the kind; and, as for England, nothing
was more remote from her wishes. It was only in order to preserve the
general peace that we had entered the Entente, and the method of the
Entente policy, the getting rid of all specific causes of difference,
was one which had nothing objectionable in it. We urged Germany also to
enter upon this path with us. We offered to help her in her progress
toward the attainment of a "place in the sun." The negotiations which
took place with Sir Edward Grey in London after my return from Berlin
in 1912 are evidence of o