e, under the presidency of
the successive Prime Ministers--first of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
and then of Mr. Asquith. Not only were the Ministers at the head of the
Admiralty and the War Office present to listen to what their experts had
to say and to assist in arriving at conclusions on the questions
discussed at these meetings, but other Ministers (including Lord Crewe,
Sir Edward Grey, Lord Morley, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Harcourt)
attended regularly. The function of this committee was to consider
strategical difficulties with which the nation might conceivably find
itself confronted, and to work out the solutions. It was a committee the
members of which were selected and summoned by the Prime Minister, to
whom it was advisory. He determined the subjects to be investigated.
Secrecy was of course essential, excepting so far as the Cabinet was
concerned. The presence of the non-military Ministers to whom I have
referred was a proper guarantee that from the Cabinet there was no
desire to withhold information. Possible operations on the Continent of
our army occupied much of the time of the committee. About the propriety
of the conversations which took place between members of the General
Staffs of France and England questions have been raised. But these
conversations were concerned with purely technical matters, and doubts
as to their justification will hardly arise in the minds of people who
are aware what modern war implies in the way of preliminary inquiries as
to its conditions.
We were not engaging in any secret undertaking. We were merely providing
what modern military requirements had rendered essential. Without study
beforehand by a General Staff military operations in these days are
bound to fail. If at any time we had, by any chance whatever, to operate
in France it was essential that our generals should possess long in
advance the knowledge that was requisite, and this could only be
obtained with the assistance of the General Staff of France itself. We
committed ourselves to no undertaking of any kind, and it was from the
first put in writing that we could not do so. The conversations were
just the natural and informal outcome of our close friendship with
France.
The French had said that if it was to be regarded as even possible that
we should come to their assistance in resisting an attack, which might,
moreover, result if successful in great prejudice to our own security in
the Channel, we should
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