na. Tirpitz quotes, but
without giving its exact date, a memorandum sent to him at Tarasp
apparently just after the 13th. It was forwarded from the Admiralty, and
was in these terms: "Our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsky, has
ascertained privately, as well as from Count Berchtold, that the
ultimatum to be sent by Austria to Serbia will contain the following
demands: I. A proclamation of King Peter to his people in which he will
command them to abstain from greater Serbian agitation. II.
Participation of a higher Austrian official in the investigation of the
assassination. III. Dismissal and punishment of all officers and
officials proved to be accomplices."
Tirpitz says that his first impression, when he received this document
in Tarasp, was that Serbia could not possibly accept the terms of such
an ultimatum. And he adds that he believed neither in the possibility of
localizing the war nor in the neutrality of England. In his view the
greatest care was required to reassure the Russian Government,
especially as England would wish "to let war break out in order to
establish the balance of power on the Continent as she understood it."
But the Chancellor expressed the wish that he should not return to
Berlin, for his doing so might give rise to remarks. If this be so, it
seems to have been a very unfortunate step. The Emperor and his most
important Ministers should all have been in Berlin at such a time.
Bethmann's advice appears intelligible only if he thought, as is quite
possible, that he could himself handle the negotiations best if the
Emperor and Tirpitz were both out of the way. If so, he was not
successful. He did not in the end respond to Sir Edward Grey's wish for
a conference, and earlier he had failed to bridle the impulsive ally who
was dashing wildly about. It looks as tho, however good his intentions
may have been, he was taking terrible risks.
Now this was the crucial period. Grey was doing his very utmost to avert
war, and was even pressing Serbia to accept the bulk of what was in the
ultimatum. As to his real intentions, I may, without presumption, claim
to be better informed than Admiral von Tirpitz. Sir Edward Grey and I
had been intimate friends for over a quarter of a century before the
period in which the Admiral, who, so far as I know, never saw him,
diagnoses the state of his intentions. During the eight years previous
to July, 1914, we had been closely associated and were working as
co
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