be able to construct one, and that I had been
delighted with the graciousness of my reception. I mention this because
the Admiral appears not to have quite understood my position. I have no
doubt that the Emperor understood it.

At the end of the conversation I felt for once a little tired, and was
glad when the Emperor asked von Tirpitz to drive me back to the Hotel
Bristol. I thought the manner of the latter during the journey highly
polite and correct, but not wholly sympathetic. I can only say that on
my part I had endeavored to put every card I had upon the table.

I have now touched on what seem to me the salient points in both of the
volumes by these two famous statesmen. I have, I hope, brought out
sufficiently the fact that on their own showing they were pursuing
contradictory policies, and that it was the consequent failure to follow
a policy that was consistent and continuous that in the end led Germany
to the slippery slope down which she glided into war. The circumstances
of the world before and in 1914 were so difficult, the piling up of
armaments had been so great, that nothing but the utmost caution could
secure a safe path. I believe the Emperor and Bethmann to have desired
wholeheartedly the preservation of the peace. But to that end they took
inadequate means, and the result was a disastrous failure to accomplish
it.

The disturbing presence of the policy of relying on a preponderance in
power over England, to be gained by a great navy, to the side of which
the smaller navies would be attracted, imposed on England the necessity
of guarding against what was menacing the national life. As the outcome
of this situation she was compelled, so long as Germany insisted on
developing her naval policy, to sit down and take thought. The result of
her deliberations may be summed up in eight propositions:

1. It was necessary, if the safety of England by sea was not to be
put in jeopardy that she should enter into real and close
friendships with other nations.

2. The great attraction to these other nations would lie in the
maintenance of British sea power.

3. While the power of the British Navy was of the first importance
to France, she might also, through no fault of her own, be placed
in such peril as made it desirable that we should be able to
render her help by land also.

4. But the military forces of France and her ally, Russia, were
great enough to make it reasonable to esti