ecessary to consider his arguments for it. The importance
of the issue, however, requires that it should be considered in a
separate chapter.

NOTE to page 47.

The argument is not affected by the contention that, while
the totality of spaces is infinite, the totality of colours
or, at any rate, the totality of instances of some other
characteristic of objects is finite; for this difference
will involve no difference in respect of perception and
conception. In both cases the apprehension that there is a
totality will be reached in the same way, i. e. through the
_conception_ of the characteristic in general, and the
apprehension in the one case that the totality is infinite
and in the other that it is finite will depend on the
apprehension of the special nature of the characteristic in
question.

CHAPTER IV

PHENOMENA AND THINGS IN THEMSELVES

The distinction between phenomena and things in themselves can be best
approached by considering Kant's formulation of the alternative views
of the nature of space and time. "What are space and time? Are they
real existences? Or are they merely determinations or relations of
things, such, however, as would also belong to them in themselves,
even if they were not perceived, or are they attached to the form of
perception only, and consequently to the subjective nature of our
mind, without which these predicates can never be attributed to any
thing?"[1]

[1] B. 37, M. 23.

Of these three alternatives, the first can be ignored. It is opposed
to the second, and is the view that space and time are things rather
than relations between things. This opposition falls within the first
member of the wider opposition between things as they are in
themselves and things as they are as perceived, and Kant, and indeed
any one, would allow that if space and time belong to things as they
are in themselves and not to things only as perceived, they are
relations between things rather than things. The real issue,
therefore, lies between the second and third alternatives. Are space
and time relations between things which belong to them both in
themselves and also as perceived by us, or are they relations which
belong to things only as perceived?

To this question we may at once reply that, inasmuch as it involves an
impossible antithesis, it is wholly unreal. The thought of a property
or a relation which belongs to things as pe