r on the one hand, as has just been
shown, space and spatial relations can only qualify something the
existence of which is not relative to perception, since it is
impossible to perceive what is spatial as it is; and on the other hand
an appearance, as being _ex hypothesi_ an appearance to some one,
i. e. to a percipient, must be relative to perception.

We may say, then, generally, that analysis of the distinction between
appearance and reality, as it is actually drawn in our ordinary
consciousness, shows the falsity of both forms of the philosophical
agnosticism which appeals to the distinction. We know things; not
appearances. We know what things are; and not merely what they appear
but are not. We may also say that Kant cannot possibly be successful
in meeting, at least in respect of space, what he calls 'the easily
foreseen but worthless objection that the ideality of space and of
time would turn the whole sensible world into pure illusion'.[29] For
space, according to him, is not a property of things in themselves; it
cannot, as has been shown, be a property of appearances; to say that
it is a property of things as they appear to us is self-contradictory;
and there is nothing else of which it can be said to be a property.

[29] _Prol_., Sec. 13, Remark iii. (Cf. p. 100 note.) Cf. the
confused note B. 70, M. 42. (See Dr. Vaihinger's Commentary
on the _Critique_, ii, 488 ff.)

In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the impossibility that
space[30] and spatial characteristics should qualify appearances
renders untenable Kant's attempt to draw a distinction between reality
and appearance _within_ 'phenomena' or 'appearances'. The passage in
which he tries to do so runs as follows:

[30] The case of time can be ignored, since, as will be seen
later (pp. 112-14), the contention that space is 'ideal'
really involves the admission that time is real.

"We generally indeed distinguish in appearances that which essentially
belongs to the perception of them, and is valid for every human
sense in general, from that which belongs to the same perception
accidentally, as valid not for the sensibility in general, but for a
particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly,
we are accustomed to say that the former is knowledge which represents
the object itself, whilst the latter represents only the appearance
of the same. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop
he