, M. 41 init.

[5] It is here assumed that this is Kant's normal view of the
phenomenal character of our knowledge. Cf. p. 75.

The above may be said to represent the train of thought by which Kant
arrived at his doctrine of time and the inner sense. It was reached by
combining recognition of the fact that we come to be aware not only of
the details of the physical world, but also of the successive process
on our part by which we have attained this knowledge, with the view
that our apprehension of this successive process is based on 'sense',
just as is our apprehension of the world. But the question remains
whether Kant is, on his own principles, entitled to speak of an inner
sense at all. According to him, knowledge begins with the production
in us of sensations, or, as we ought to say in the present context,
appearances by the action of things in themselves. These sensations or
appearances can reasonably be ascribed to external sense. They may be
ascribed to sense, because they arise through our being _affected_ by
things in themselves. The sense may be called external, because the
object affecting it is external to the mind, i. e. independent of it.
In conformity with this account, internal sense must be the power of
being affected by something internal to the mind, i. e. dependent upon
the mind itself, and since being affected implies the activity of
affecting, it will be the power of being affected by the mind's own
activity.[6] The activity will presumably be that of arranging
spatially the sensations or appearances due to things in
themselves.[7] This activity must be said to produce an affection in
us, the affection being an appearance due to ourselves. Lastly, the
mind must be said to arrange these appearances temporally. Hence it
will be said to follow that we know only the appearances due to
ourselves and not ourselves, and that time is only a determination of
these appearances.[8]

[6] B. 68 init., M. 41 init.

[7] The precise nature of the activity makes no difference to
the argument.

[8] In B. 152 fin., M. 93 fin. Kant expresses his conclusion
in the form that we know ourselves only as we appear to
ourselves, and not as we are in ourselves (cf. p. 75). The
above account, and the criticism which immediately follows,
can be adapted, _mutatis mutandis_, to this form of the view.

The weakness of the position just stated lies on the surface. It
provides no means