na owing to Kant's view that bodies in space are phenomena.
Otherwise, 'phenomena' offers no contrast to 'our state' and to
'representations'. The passage, therefore, presupposes a distinction
between states of ourselves and things in space, the former being
internal to, or dependent upon, and the latter external to, or
independent of, the mind.

It should now be easy to see that the argument involves a complete
_non sequitur_. The conclusion which is justified is that time is a
form not of things but of our own states. For the fact to which he
appeals is that while things, as being spatial, are not related
temporally, our states are temporally related; and if 'a form' be
understood as a mode of relation, this fact can be expressed by the
formula 'Time is a form not of things but of our own states', the
corresponding formula in the case of space being 'Space is a form not
of our states but of things'. But the conclusion which Kant desires
to draw--and which he, in fact, actually draws--is the quite different
conclusion that time is a form of _perception_ of our states, the
corresponding conclusion in the case of space being that space is a
form of perception of things. For time is to be shown to be the form
of inner sense, i. e. the form of the perception of what is internal
to ourselves, i. e. of our own states.[10] The fact is that the same
unconscious transition takes place in Kant's account of time which, as
we saw,[11] takes place in his account of space. In the case of space,
Kant passes from the assertion that space is a form of things, in the
sense that all things are spatially related--an assertion which he
expresses by saying that space is the form of phenomena--to the quite
different assertion that space is a form of perception, in the sense
of a way in which we perceive things as opposed to a way in which
things are. Similarly, in the case of time, Kant passes from the
assertion that time is the form of our internal states, in the sense
that all our states are temporally related, to the assertion that time
is a way in which we perceive our states as opposed to a way in which
our states really are. Further, the two positions, which he thus fails
to distinguish, are not only different, but incompatible. For if space
is a form of things, and time is a form of our states, space and time
cannot belong only to our mode of perceiving things and ourselves
respectively, and not to the things and ourselves; for _ex hy